Foreword: Errors of Comity? by Herman, Lawrence
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Volume 44, Number 2, 1983
Symposium:
State Prisoner Use of Federal Habeas Corpus Procedures
Foreword: Errors of Comity?
LAWRENCE HERMAN *
The subject of this symposium is federal habeas corpus, primarily habeas
for state prisoners. I first encountered the subject in 1958 when I clerked for a
United States district judge in Chicago. On a day when I was the only person
in chambers, the Clerk of Court brought in a habeas petition. "I hope it's not
too late," he said. "What do you mean?" I asked. "He's scheduled to be
executed tonight," he replied. I started to panic; for a moment, I considered
forging the judge's signature to a stay of execution. But reason prevailed, and
instead I called the Illinois Supreme Court. I learned that the execution had
already been stayed. Charles Townsend was not in immediate danger. His
case subsequently gained a measure of notoriety.'
1958 was not a big year for federal habeas corpus. Although Brown
v. Allen 2 was five years old, state prisoners had relatively few federal con-
stitutional protections and thus few occasions for seeking federal relief.' The
next decade, however, saw a due process revolution 4 in which constitutional
protections, previously limited to federal criminal proceedings, were
extended to state cases 5 and new protections were created and made ap-
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1. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
2. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
3. In 1958 defendants in state criminal cases were protected by federal constitutional principles against
bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; vague criminal statutes, Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Hemdon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); conviction for protected activities of
speech, Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); or religion, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940);
involuntary confessions, Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); and trial in a mob-dominated atmosphere,
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). Black defendants were additionally protected against the exclusion of
blacks from grand and petit juries. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939). Indigent defendants were entitled to
court-appointed counsel in capital cases, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), and, if special circumstances
were present, in noncapital cases as well. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). They were also entitled to a free
transcript to perfect a first appeal as of right. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In rare situations, tangible
evidence obtained by brutality was inadmissible. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
4. See generally F. GRAHAM, THE DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION (1970) (hardcover edition entitled THE
SELF-INFLICTED WOUND).
5. Exclusion of evidence obtained by unreasonable search or seizure, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1%2); indigent's right
to court-appointed counsel in noncapital felonies regardless of special circumstances, Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); right to
confront adverse witnesses, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); right to a speedy trial, Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); right to compulsory process, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); right to
trial by jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); protection against double jeopardy. Benton v. Mary-
land, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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plicable to both.6 Some of these rights were made retroactive, either wholly 7
or in part. 8
These developments were not received by the states with unalloyed
enthusiasm. Although state postconviction processes did exist, their proce-
dural requirements were stringent and the grounds for relief narrow. 9 Thus,
they were often useless to the imprisoned who sought the retroactive benefit
of constitutional protections. And those who sought prospective protection
through the direct appellate process often found that the rights on which they
relied were interpreted with a wooden reluctance that bordered on disdain.'o
Into this federalism vacuum, federal habeas was virtually sucked.
As the use of habeas burgeoned, a reaction set in. By strokes of interpre-
tation, the Supreme Court narrowed the federal habeas statute both substan-
tively " and procedurally. 12 Recently, Congress has been asked to constrict it
even more, 3 and the habeas problem has thus become part of the larger
problem of access to the federal courts.
The articles in the present symposium accurately portray the many faces
of federal habeas corpus. Judge Rosenn traces the "flow and ebb" 4 of federal
habeas jurisdiction and convincingly demonstrates that both are functions of
social and political conditions. Professor Saltzburg reminds us that federal
habeas jurisdiction is conferred by statute and that the role of federal courts-
particularly the Supreme Court-should be, but has not always been, inter-
6. For example, indigent's right to court-appointed counsel at arraignment in capital case, Hamilton v.
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); exclusion of intangible evidence (confession) derived from unconstitutional
seizure of the person, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); indigent's right to court-appointed
counsel on first appeal as of right, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); indigent's right to court-appointed
counsel at preliminary hearing in capital case, White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); right to counsel as
restriction on postindictment effort to elicit incriminating statements, Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964); right to counsel at custodial interrogation, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); privilege against
self-incrimination and right to counsel at custodial interrogation, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
clear-cut judicial determination of voluntariness before confession submitted to jury, Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964); right to counsel at postindictment lineup, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); due process protection against use of unreliable identification evidence, Stovall
v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); right to counsel at sentencing proceeding, Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967);
fourth amendment applicable to electronic seizure of conversation, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
right to confrontation as restriction on use of one defendant's confession in multidefendant trial, Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
7. For example, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), was made fully retroactive in Pickelsimer v.
Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), was made fully retroactive in Eskridge v.
Washington, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
8. For example, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was made applicable to pre-Miranda interroga-
tions as long as the trial began after Miranda was decided. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
9. See generally Symposium on Post-Conviction Remedies, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 237 (1966).
10. See Herman, Foreword and Afterword, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 237, 243 (1966).
11. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (federal habeas not available for fourth amendment issue that
petitioner had full and fair opportunity to litigate in state court).
12. For example, Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (habeas petition must be dismissed if it contains both
exhausted and unexhausted claims); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (habeas petitioner who failed to
object at trial must show cause and prejudice).
13. See Remington, State Prisoner Access to Postconviction Relief-A Lessening Role for Federal Courts;
An Increasingly Important Role for State Courts, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 287 (1983).
14. The quoted words are from Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Pro-
cedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151 (1980).
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pretive rather than creative. Professor Remington explores the federal-state
tension wrought by habeas review and notes the one-sided effort to ameliorate
it by restricting access to the federal courts. Professors Yackle and Robbins
dig more deeply into the tension problem by taking on the exhaustion re-
quirement and the certificate of probable cause for appellate review. Finally,
Professor Meador suggests that much of the habeas problem might be re-
solved by conferring on the federal appellate courts the authority to review
directly the constitutional-criminal decisions of state courts of last resort.
The reading is not light. It is, however, important, for it deals with the
enforcement of rights that are the core of the relationship between the indi-
vidual and the state.
In 1966 the Ohio State Law Journal published a student symposium on
postconviction remedies. 5 In a foreword to that symposium, I made an ob-
servation that bears repeating today:
Each of [the cases in which post-conviction relief has been granted] demonstrates
that the criminal process is agile enough to catch up with its mistakes. Un-
fortunately, each of these cases also demonstrates that the process is not suf-
ficiently agile to avoid mistakes. Well-founded concern for the adequacy of post-
conviction procedures should not be permitted to obscure the fact that such pro-
cedures are but a cure for an illness in a specific case and that they neither
eliminate nor prevent the disease on a wholesale basis. The critical problem is not
cure but prevention .... 16
There would be less tension-indeed, far fewer occasions for federal habeas
relief-if state courts vigorously enforced federal constitutional rights in
criminal cases. "[I]n a system of constitutional federalism the states have to
be willing to carry their fair share of the load without being forced to do it." 17
15. Symposium on Post-Conviction Remedies, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 237 (1966).
16. Herman, Foreword and Aftenord, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 237, 242 (1966).
17. L. HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MISDEMEANOR COURT 69 (1973).
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